Recent Victories for Trupiano Law in Immigration Removal Defense
Salt Lake area law firm, practicing in immigration and criminal-juvenile defense
If you are looking for a criminal defense and/or immigration defense lawyer for yourself or a loved one, you want positive results. We agree in that objective and aggressively pursue the best possible results for our clients.
Below is a list, which is not all inclusive, of representative cases involving clients who were placed in some sort of removal proceedings or deferred inspection in which removal was imminent and Trupiano Law obtained successful results.
Trupiano Law Obtains Relief Against Removal
Matter of E. S. -
Mr. S is an ethnic Ossetian and Georgian citizen from the separatist region of South Ossetia located in the Republic of Georgia. Ms. Trupiano was retained to work with the attorney of record on this matter. Ms. Trupiano successfully argued for Mr. S’s asylum on the basis that he was subject to past persecution on account of his nationality and membership in a particular social group. Mr. S experienced officially sanctioned job discrimination as a government employee for a period of twenty-two years and pressure from the Georgian government starting in 1990 to leave the country because he is a “non-Georgian.” When Georgia obtained independence in April 1991 from the Soviet Union Mr. S experienced a pattern and practice of government brutality. Since he did not leave Georgia after being threatened to leave, he was physically forced to participate in a war against his own ethnic group where he witnessed Georgian national guards commit brutal and atrocious acts, such as blowing up Ossetians’ homes, burning their villages, and beating up elderly persons, women, and children. He was forced to witness the bellies of Ossetian pregnant women being cut open after which the women were drowned in icy waters. He witnessed an Ossetian mother having to watch as the National Guard “cut out her son’s genitals and made [her] eat them” before she passed out.
Ms. Trupiano successfully argued that, applying the law and facts of Woldemeskel v. INS, 257 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2001), the events that occurred to Mr. S and his family and fellow members of minority ethnic groups in Georgia constituted “persecution” for purposes of Mr. S’s obtaining refugee status and a grant of asylum or withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
Matter of Y. P. -
Ms. P is a native and citizen of Vietnam. The immigration judge has ruled that Trupiano Law has met its burden of proof as to the fact that there is a reasonable probability that Ms. Y will be persecuted if returned to Vietnam and that Ms. Y is worthy of the asylum relief.
Matter of A. K. -
Mr. K is a citizen of Poland who had been residing in Canada as a legal permanent resident. He was caught by Taylorsville police and was arrested for shoplifting approximately $900 worth of merchandise from a store in Utah. ICE interviewed him while at the Salt Lake Metro Jail. Trupiano Law represented Mr. K for the criminal matter and ensured that Ms. K made no incriminating statements so that charges were subsequently never filed. Trupiano Law sought voluntary departure, which was granted. Mr. K was eligible for voluntary departure under INA § 240B(a)(1) “in lieu of being subject to proceedings under Section 240 or prior to the completion of such proceedings . . . .” This would allow Mr. K to continue to enter the United States on a tourist visa as he had become accustomed to doing over the last several years – which was Mr. K’s objective in this matter.
Matter of O. C. -
Synopsis: Case reopened successfully under INA 240(b)(5)(C)(ii); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii), where removal order was issued in absentia in 1996 when alien was 18 years old based on notice of hearing sent to alien’s custodial guardian when alien was 17 years old.
Mr. C is a citizen of El Salvador. He was ordered deported in absentia right after he turned 18 years old in 1996. He had been caught at the border as an unaccompanied minor when he was 17 and turned over to the custody of his brother. While he was still 17 years old, ICE mailed to his brother a notice of hearing. His brother intentionally kept the notice from respondent and did not transport Mr. C to the hearing. Thus, Mr. C was ordered deported in absentia since he did not appear at his hearing. Later, in 2009, Mr. C was picked up by ICE on the old removal order.
Trupiano Law quickly filed an emergency motion to reopen which stayed the execution of his removal order. A motion to reopen filed pursuant to INA § 240(b)(5)(C)(ii), “shall stay the removal of the alien pending disposition of the motion by the immigration judge.” INA § 240(b)(5)(C). Trupiano Law argued that Mr. C’s due process rights were violated where ICE had placed him in the custody of his older adult brother for the statutory purpose of “secur[ing] his or her timely appearance before the Service or the Immigration Court . . . .” 8 C.F.R. § 1236.3(b)(1)(iii). That is, Mr. C had no choice as he was a juvenile at the time when ICE put him in the custody of his brother. ICE had made it his brother’s responsibility to ensure Mr. C appeared at his hearing. Thus, it was no fault of Mr. C that his brother did not tell him about the hearing and did not transport him, even though he turned 18 years old after the notice of hearing was sent to his brother. The immigration judge agreed with Trupiano Law’s arguments and reopened the case.
Matter of D. D. -
Synopsis: Case reopened successfully under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) and (4) where Mr. D’s asylum claim was previously denied by an immigration judge at trial (individual hearing). Trupiano Law prepared a motion to reopen the proceedings based on new evidence that should have been introduced before but for ineffective assistance of previous counsel.
Mr. D is a native and citizen of Vietnam. His previous attorney had failed to introduce critical evidence of his asylum claims. Trupiano Law rebuilt the case, including issuing expert opinions and compiling important relevant evidence of facts that demonstrated Mr. D would be persecuted or tortured if removed to Vietnam. The Board of immigration Appeals agreed with Trupiano Law’s argument and reopened the case.
Matter of R. J. -
Mr. J. is a native and citizen of the Philippines. He entered lawfully in 2002 on an H-2B visa. However, DHS charged him with overstaying where his employer allegedly, though an agent, failed to maintain Mr. J’s lawful status. Mr. J’s employer was a major chain of hotels across Wyoming, Colorado, and other states. Mr. J’s employer had filed a Form I-140 for permanent residence employment visa under INA § 203(b)(3)(A)(iii), “other skilled worker.” This application approved by USCIS, however, USCIS denied Mr. J’s application to adjust his status, by alleging that Mr. J had overstayed his H-2b visa and had worked without authorization. Mr. J was issued placed in removal proceedings by being issued a Notice to Appear. Trupiano Law was then retained to defend Mr. J in removal proceedings, the objective being to make him eligible to adjust his status and to work for his employer who very much wanted Mr. J to continue his presence the United States. The immigration judge declared his intent to deport Mr. J where he could see no other way for Mr. J to remain in the United State unless he was willing to voluntarily depart. Ms. Trupiano asked for more time to prepare a legal brief of his defenses, due to the complexity of facts and law. Immigration Judge Dustin Pead graciously granted that request.
Trupiano Law submitted a brief entitled “Legal Memorandum in Support of Respondent’s Application to Adjust his Status Based on His Approved I-140.”
The immigration judge has conceded that Mr. J has a claim for relief after all and has set the matter for an individual hearing (which is a trial in immigration court). The immigration judge was most convinced by Trupiano Law’s argument that Mr. J may be able to adjust his status even though he may have overstayed his employment visa and worked without authorization, “but for USCIS technical errors and blunders of [Employer] and [Labor Agent], Respondent may not be restricted from adjusting his status even though he failed to maintain lawful status “continuously . . . since entry into the United States” so long as any failure to maintain status was “other than through no fault of his or her own or for technical reasons.” 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(b)(6). See also 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(d)(2)(i)-(iv). The Act specifically provides an exception for failure to maintain non-immigrant status so long as it is “other than through no fault of his own or for technical reasons.” INA § 245(c)(2). Thus, Mr. J is now allowed to have his day in court to prove that he should be allowed to adjust his status where any unlawful presence or employment was due to no fault of his and or due to technical errors of USCIS or his employer.
In the mean time, Trupiano Law has been able to obtain Mr. J’s employment authorization where he now again has a pending adjustment of status application so he is eligible to work inter alia pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(9). So long as the alien has an application for adjustment of status pending, employment “shall not be deemed to have engaged in unauthorized employment during the pendency of his or her adjustment application.” 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(b)(10). Mr. J’s authorization to work for his employer was also a critical objective of Mr. J and his employer that Trupiano Law was able to achieve.
Matter of G. G. -
Mr. G is a citizen of Mexico and was a confidential informant in the United States for several years. He was placed in expedited removal proceedings under INA § 238. Trupiano Law sought deferral and withholding of removal on the grounds that if he returned to Mexico that official secretly working for the Mexican government would torture or kill Mr. G. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b), (b)(2); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b). See also INA § 241(b)(3)(B)(ii); 8 USC § 1251(b)(3)(B)(ii); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). The asylum officer made a favorable credibility and reasonable fear findings, concluding that Mr. G had met his burden of showing that he had a “reasonable fear of persecution or torture.” The asylum officer, in making a favorable credible and reasonable fear finding, must determine:
if the alien establishes a reasonable possibility that he or she would be persecuted on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, or a reasonable possibility that he or she would be tortured in the country of removal.
8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(c). Trupiano Law currently has on appeal with the Tenth Circuit a Petition for Review. The primary issue there is that, although the asylum officer later granted Mr. G’s application for asylum, ICE’s placement of Mr. G in expedited removal proceedings under INA § 238 was improper in the first place. Below are some excerpts of some key arguments:
Mr. [G] is not properly described as an alien subject to INA § 238 proceedings where ICE did not place him in said proceedings right after his incarceration for the underlying sentence, that is, the sentence for his 1993 conviction. Congress mandated that INA § 238 proceedings be initiated “in a manner which assures expeditious removal following the end of the alien’s incarceration for the underlying sentence.” INA § 238(a)(1) (emphasis added).
* * *
The issuance of the Final Order of Removal was fundamentally unfair in violation of Mr. [G]’s due process rights. This is because ICE issued the removal order before and without giving Mr. Salamanca a meaningful opportunity to challenge the evidence pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§ 238.1 (c) 1238.1(c), and the charges against him, i.e., the classification of his 1993 controlled substance conviction as an aggravated felony. Mr. [G] was prejudiced where he was not permitted to rebut the evidence and argue that his 1993 controlled substance conviction is not an aggravated felony where it is not a felony under the United States Controlled Substances Act.
Trupiano Law hopes that this case will provide clarification to many as it is a case of first impression in the Tenth Circuit and many other federal appellate circuits of the United States.
Matter of D. B. -
Mr. B is a native and citizen of Bosnia and has had refugee status in the United States for several years. He had convictions for
- One count of theft under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602
- One count of disorderly conduct under Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-102
- One count of interfering with lawful arrest under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305(2)
- Two counts of possession of alcohol by a minor under Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-209.
Mr. B had left the United States for vacation in Europe. When he reentered it came to the attention of the Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) officer that Mr. B had some conviction that may make him inadmissible. Thus, he was paroled in temporarily subject to a deferred inspection. See 8 C.F.R. § 1235.2. Trupiano Law quickly gathered from the various criminal courts the requisite documents to demonstrate the facts and prepared a legal brief of the Utah state convictions. The CBP officer was convinced with Trupiano Law’s arguments that Mr. B was admissible notwithstanding his criminal convictions. Trupiano Law argued that all of the convictions except the one theft case were not crime involving moral turpitude under INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) and INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii). Trupiano Law then demonstrated that the one theft case constituted a petty crime exception under INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II). Thus, the CBP officer agreed to admit Mr. B back into the United States without any further incident. Without Trupiano Law’s help, Mr. B might have been arrested right there at the deferred inspection meeting and placed in mandatory detention and sent to appear before an immigration judge in removal proceedings.
